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Houston v. Bank of America Federal Savings Bank, 78 P.3d 71 
(Nev. 2003).1 
 
PROPERTY – EQUITABLE SUBROGATION 
 
Summary 
 
 Appellants Edward R. Houston and Regina Houston paid David Boone $740,000 
for investment services, which Boone converted to his own use.  In May 1998, Boone and 
his wife Donna divorced and Boone quitclaimed real property to Donna.  Norwest 
Mortgage, Respondent Bank of America’s predecessor, held a deed of trust on the real 
property for $342,000.  That same month, the Houstons filed a complaint against Boone 
to recover their $740,000.  The Houstons filed a notice of lis pendens in the Clark County 
Recorder’s Office on June 1, 1998 and filed an ex parte motion with the district court 
directing the issuance of a prejudgment writ of attachment.  The court granted the motion 
and a writ of attachment was filed in the Clark County Recorder’s Office in June 1998.  
The Houstons obtained a judgment against Boone, who had filed for bankruptcy.  Boone 
stipulated that the debt he owed to the Houstons was nondischargeable.  The district court 
granted a writ of execution on the real property and scheduled a sale of the real property.  
Respondent Bank of America intervened and the sale was enjoined. 
 Bank of America had refinanced the real property in June 1998, after the 
Houstons’ writ of attachment had been recorded.  In May 1998, pursuant to Bank of 
America’s direction, Nevada Title Company had conducted a title search of the property.   
 Both Bank of America and the Houstons filed motions for summary judgment 
after the district court enjoined the sale.  Bank of America argued that it was the priority 
lien holder on the real property because it was equitably subrogated to the rights of 
Norwest Mortgage when it refinanced the property.  The Houstons argued that Bank of 
America was negligent in failing to discover their interest in the real property and that 
they would be injured if the district court allowed Bank of America to hold the priority 
lien position.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank of America 
and denied the Houston’s motion for summary judgment.  The Houstons appealed. 
 The Nevada Supreme Court adopted the approach of the Restatement (Third) of 
Property for equitable subrogation and found that because the Houstons failed to produce 
any evidence that equitable subrogation of Bank of America to Norwest’s priority lien 
position would materially prejudice them, Bank of America was entitled to equitable 
subrogation as to the full amount of the Norwest Mortgage deed of trust.  
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
 
 Is a lender who pays off a prior note equitably subrogated to the former lender’s 
priority position?   
 
                                                 
1 By Amy A. Johnson 
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Does it matter if there is an intervening lien holder? 
 
Disposition 
 
 Yes.  A subsequent lender who pays off a prior note is equitably subrogated to the 
prior lender’s priority lien position.  
 
No.  The subsequent lender will still be equitably subrogated to the full amount of 
the prior note even if there is an intervening lien holder, so long as the intervening lien 
holder is not materially prejudiced.  
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Houston 
 
 The issue presented in Houston is one of first impression.  Prior to Houston, the 
Nevada Supreme Court addressed equitable subrogation in Laffranchini v. Clark.  
However, in Laffranchini, the issue was equitable subrogation of a holder of an invalid 
mortgage when the holder was an involuntary creditor.2  In Laffranchini, the court held 
that the holder of the invalid mortgage was entitled to be equitably subrogated to the 
priority position of the lender whose note it had paid off because the holder was not a 
volunteer.3  Other jurisdictions have adopted three different approaches to determine 
when a second lender will be equitably subrogated to the priority of the first lender when 
a third party holds a lien on the property at the time the second lender paid off the first 
lender’s encumbrance.4   
 
Other Jurisdictions – The Majority Approach 
 
The majority approach is that actual knowledge of an existing lien prevents the 
second holder from being equitably subrogated to the priority of the first lender, but 
constructive knowledge does not.5  The majority approach reasons that if a mortgagee 
does not have actual knowledge of a junior lien holder, the mortgagee expected to assume 
the position of the creditor whose lien it is paying off.6  However, the majority rule 
encourages prospective lenders to avoid conducting title searches because the lender who 
fails to conduct a title search will be equitably subrogated to the priority position by 
virtue of its lack of actual knowledge.  On the other hand, the lender who dutifully 
conducts a title search and discovers a junior lien holder will not be equitably subrogated 
to the priority position.   
 
                                                 
2 Laffranchini v. Clark, 39 Nev. 48, 55-56, 153 P. 250, 251-52 (1915). 
3 Id. 
4 East Boston Savings Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1998). 
5 See, e.g. Osterman v. Babar, 714 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170, 
172 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
6 George E. Osborne, Mortgages § 282, at 573 (2d ed. 1970). 
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Other Jurisdictions – The Actual or Constructive Knowledge Approach 
  
The second approach prevents the second lien holder from being equitably 
subrogated when that holder has either actual or constructive knowledge of an existing 
junior lien.7  Additionally, some courts will hold a sophisticated lender to a higher 
standard or will consider the lender’s negligence in determining whether to apply 
equitable subrogation.8  This approach, however, fails to account for the very purpose of 
equitable subrogation.  Equitable subrogation is designed to prevent a junior lienor from 
being advanced to the priority lien position over a secondary holder who has paid off the 
first lien on the real property.9  In that instance, allowing a junior lienor to be elevated to 
the priority position would afford the junior lienor an undeserved windfall.10  Negligence 
and constructive knowledge should not be factored into whether a lender will be 
equitably subrogated.  Equitable subrogation is aimed at protecting the lender’s justified 
expectation11 in receiving a security interest in the property and at preventing the unjust 
enrichment of the junior lienor.12   
 
Other Jurisdictions – The Restatement (Third) of Property Approach 
 
 The Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, section 7.6 does not consider 
whether a lender has actual or constructive notice of a junior lien, but only whether a 
junior lien holder will be prejudiced if the second lender is equitably subrogated to the 
priority position.13  Notice of an intervening lien will not prevent a party from being 
equitably subrogated.14  The issue is whether the secondary lienor expected to be 
subrogated to the priority lien position upon payment of the priority lien.15  Equitable 
subrogation of a refinancing mortgagee will not occur only if there is affirmative proof 
that the refinancing mortgagee intended to subrogate its interest to the intervening junior 
lienor.16  The intervening junior lien suffers no material prejudice by applying the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation because the junior lienor remains in the same position it 
                                                 
7 See Harms v. Burt, 40 P.3d 329, 332 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); 681 A.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1996). 
8 See, e.g. Universal Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
professionals will be held to a higher standard than lay persons when determining equitable subrogation); 
Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 25 P.3d 877, 882 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
9 Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.6 cmt. a. 
10 Id. 
11 Even where a lender has actual knowledge of an existing lien on real property, that lender assumes it will 
be equitably subrogated to the priority lien position.  Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.6 cmt. 
e. 
12 Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 10.6, at 15-16 (4th ed. 2002). 
13 See, e.g. Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat. Bank, 792 So. 2d 1222, 1227 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); 
Trus Joist Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603, 609 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); Klotz v. 
Klotz, 440 N.W.2d 406, 407-10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).  Trus Joist Corp. and Klotz do not adopt the 
Restatement, but the holdings are similar to the Restatement view.  
14 Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages §7.6(a)(4). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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held prior to refinancing17.18  The intervening lienor is “no worse off than before the 
senior obligation was discharged.”19   
 
Effect of Houston on current law 
 
In Houston, the court reasoned through the above approaches for equitable 
subrogation and adopted the Restatement (Third) of Property approach.  Bank of America 
paid in full the deed of trust held by Norwest Mortgage.  The district court found that 
Bank of America paid the deed of trust “with the intention and belief that it would 
acquire Norwest Mortgage’s first-position deed of trust lien on the Property.”  There was 
no evidence that Bank of America intended to subordinate its lien priority to the 
Houstons.20  The Houstons argued that issues of fact existed as to whether they would be 
materially prejudiced by equitably subrogating Bank of America to the priority position.  
However, the Houstons did not produce any evidence of prejudice nor did they request 
additional time to produce such evidence.  The Houstons did not show that a change in 
the mortgagor from Boone and Donna to just Donna materially prejudiced them.21  The 
Houstons did not provide evidence that the new loan’s terms modified the previous loan’s 
terms in such a manner as to materially prejudice them.  Therefore, Bank of America was 
entitled to be equitably subrogated to the full amount of Norwest Mortgage’s priority lien 
position. 
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
 Central to the Restatement (Third) of Property approach to equitable subrogation 
is the issue of material prejudice to the intervening lender.  However, the court failed to 
clarify what exactly constitutes material prejudice.  The court stated that had there been a 
showing that the transfer of mortgagor resulted in a mortgagor with a bad credit rating, so 
little money, or so few assets that the bank would likely have to foreclose on the property 
resulting in a loss of the intervening lienor’s interest in the property, such might serve as 
material prejudice.  However, the court did not affirmatively state that these factors are 
the guidelines for determining material prejudice.   
                                                 
17 However, should subrogation result in material prejudice to the junior lienor, equitable subrogation will 
not be applied.  Nelson & Whitman, supra note 10, § 10.6, at 19. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at § 7.6 cmt. a. 
20 The Houstons argued that Bank of America was negligent in failing to discover the lis pendens and the 
writ of attachment and that factual issues existed as to whether Bank of America was justified in relying on 
a title report run one month prior to the closing of the loan.  The Nevada Supreme Court found that because 
it was adopting the Restatement position, Bank of America’s negligence in failing to discover the lis 
pendens and writ of attachment was irrelevant.  The court did not address the Houston’s contention that 
factual issues existed as to whether Bank of America was reasonable in relying on the month-old title 
report.  It is most likely that the court did not address this because under the Restatement view, actual and 
constructive knowledge do not matter.  Even if Bank of America had actual knowledge of the Houston’s 
intervening lien, absent a finding of material prejudice, Bank of America would nonetheless be subrogated 
to the priority position. 
21 The Houstons made no showing that Donna has poor credit, makes so little money, or has such limited 
assets that Bank of America would likely have to foreclose on the property, causing the Houstons to lose 
their interest in the property.   
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The court also stated there was no evidence of the previous loan’s terms to 
compare with the new loan’s terms that would allow a determination of whether 
modifications existed that would materially prejudice the intervening lienor.  While the 
court seemed to indicate that certain modifications in the terms of a new loan would 
materially prejudice an intervening lienor, it failed to clarify exactly which terms those 
might be.  The issue of material prejudice has been left open, resulting almost certainly in 
future litigation.  The court will then be forced to clearly spell out the factors that 
constitute material prejudice in equitable subrogation.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Refinancing lenders are more easily assured of their position following 
refinancing of a priority loan.  Refinancing lenders almost need not worry about 
intervening liens, so long as the refinance does not “materially prejudice” an intervening 
lienor.  The decision reduces title searches to a mere formality, and seems to place wide 
discretion in the hands of lenders in considering what is material prejudice.  Intervening 
lienors have very little assurance that the recordation of their junior lien will offer any 
protection.   
Appropriately, the Restatement approach furthers the policy that it is burdensome 
for lenders to be expected to conduct a title search multiple times during the course of a 
transaction in order to determine whether an intervening lien has attached.  Had the court 
adopted an actual or constructive notice approach for equitable subrogation, a refinancing 
lender would be expected to conduct a title search a minimum of two times (once in the 
beginning of the transaction and once prior to closing).  Serious problems would arise 
when the lender found a clean title at the beginning of the refinancing process yet 
suddenly was presented with an intervening lien on the closing date.  A lender would be 
forced to conduct a title search almost every day in order to make sure that the lender 
would not lose its priority position through the refinance.  Requiring this of lenders 
would seriously clog the refinancing process and make it an unavailable process for most 
homeowners.  Compared to the approaches adopted by other jurisdictions, the 
Restatement approach seems to be the most consistent with the purpose of equitable 
subrogation. 
